What is standardized, what is still in draft, and how much of the ecosystem has actually moved.
Q-Watch NetworkThese standards exist because of the threat modeled in the sister site's Q-Day clock.Q-Day clock on QSense Watch
CRYSTALS-Kyber
The default PQC key exchange. Deployed in hybrid X25519MLKEM768 across Chrome, Firefox, Cloudflare, AWS and OpenSSH.
Full profileCRYSTALS-Dilithium
Primary general-purpose PQC signature. Certificate ecosystem support is still maturing.
Full profileSPHINCS+
Conservative hash-based backup signature. Large signatures limit use to firmware and root-of-trust signing.
Full profileFALCON
Compact signatures attractive for certificates; floating-point implementation raises side-channel concerns.
Full profileHamming Quasi-Cyclic
Selected March 2025 as a code-based backup to ML-KEM in case of a lattice break. Draft expected 2026.
Full profileApproved for firmware signing only. State management makes general-purpose use hazardous.
Full profileVery large public keys, very small ciphertexts. Favored in some European long-term confidentiality guidance.
Full profileDated decisions from standards bodies and the deadlines regulators have committed to.
NIST opens the public competition to standardize quantum-resistant public-key algorithms.
SourceNSA publishes Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, setting PQC transition timelines for national security systems.
SourceUS federal agencies directed to inventory cryptographic systems and plan migration.
ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA become final US federal standards.
SourceDraft guidance deprecating RSA and ECC by 2030 and disallowing them after 2035.
A code-based alternative is chosen to hedge against a structural break in lattice assumptions.
NSA requirement milestone for national security systems.
Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks directs the federal PQC transition, sets key establishment by 2030 and signatures by 2031 for prioritized systems, and starts the FAR rulemaking clocks.
SourceExecution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. Five-phase schedule from 2026 to 2035, agency plans due in 120 days, detailed guidance on algorithm selection, hybrid key exchange, crypto-agility and zero trust.
SourceM-26-15 gives GSA 60 days to establish an interagency working group on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential and Access Management for PQC.
SourceFederal civilian agencies must stop counting FIPS 140-2 validated modules toward compliance and track replacements in their migration plans.
SourceAll FIPS 140-2 validated modules move to the CMVP historical list. Agencies and contractors can no longer rely on them for new procurements, and auditors will flag them in inventories.
Source120 days from M-26-15. Plans must include risk-based prioritization, phased timelines, automated inventory methodology, a crypto-agility architecture plan, third-party coordination, funding estimates and governance roles.
Source180 days from EO 14412. The proposed rule would require covered contractors to comply with NIST FIPS, including FIPS 203, 204 and 205, by December 31, 2030.
SourceEU Member States commit to starting migration of critical infrastructure.
Falcon-based signature standard expected to be finalized.
National security systems entering acquisition are expected to support and prefer CNSA 2.0 algorithms, with CNSA 1.0 retired on the NSS timeline rather than the civilian one.
Source270 days from EO 14412. Contractor vulnerability disclosure policies would have to accept reports of cryptographic weaknesses, including missing encryption and non-FIPS-approved algorithms.
SourceEO 14412 gives CISA and NIST 270 days to define the minimum elements of a cryptographic bill of materials, the input every automated inventory program depends on.
SourceEO 14412 and M-26-15 Phase 3: key establishment migrated to PQC across High Value Assets, high-impact systems and systems holding highly sensitive data. TLS 1.3 or successor also required by January 2, 2030.
Source112-bit classical public-key cryptography deprecated for federal use.
The proposed rule sets December 31, 2030 as the date covered contractors must meet NIST post-quantum FIPS standards.
SourceM-26-15 Phase 4 aligns with the EO function-based split: key establishment by 2030, digital signatures by 2031.
SourceNSS complete the transition to the CNSA 2.0 suite, ahead of the civilian 2035 endpoint.
SourceAll national security systems expected to be exclusively quantum-resistant.
NIST IR 8547 disallows 112-bit classical public-key cryptography after 2035. M-26-15 Phase 5 puts the same year on the record for full federal migration of remaining systems.
Source